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opinion concerning matters which came 
under the Act. 
Who Should Be Responsible for 
justifying Experiments? 
The Current Advisory Committee, 
in framing its suggestions to the govern-
ment for new legislation, also felt that 
experiments need to be justified, although 
it did not recommend that the Advisory 
Committee should be granted executive 
powers, since this move might be prohib-
ited by expense. The Committee did, how-
ever, draw heavily on the approach al-
ready offered by the Lords Select Com-
mittee and concluded- after consider-
able debate on the matter- that the 
public would not be satisfied with any 
new law that did not put the onus of jus-
tification firmly on the shoulders of those 
administering the new Act- ultimately, 
the Home Secretary (Advisory Committee 
on Animal Experiments, 1981 ). Of course, 
the Home Office will probably be reluc-
ant to accept this kind of responsibility 
readily, and the scientific community 
will certainly oppose this measure on 
the grounds that it will hamper scientific 
freedom. 
It is a great pity that the more ex-
treme animal activists, in criticizing both 
Committees for not going far enough, 
have failed to recognize the significance 
of this new approach, since it does at 
last provide a mechanism for attaining 
what the Royal Commission of 1875 
sought to achieve in drafting its legisla-
tion, namely, that "the progress of medi-
cal knowledge [be] compatible with the 
just claims of humanity" (Departmental 
Committee on Experiments in Animals, 
1965). 
CRAE has recognized that this goal 
can only be attained through administra-
tive means and that, at the same time, 
any new law must be flexible enough to 
permit progressive strengthening of its 
provisions as the need arises. This objec-
tive of a balanced view toward animal 
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Comment 
experimentation can be achieved if gov-
ernment, scientists and the reform groups 
continue to work together as they have 
for the last 2 years. But if these attempts 
fail, the militants can be expected to be-
come more vociferous, polarization will 
deepen, the productive dialogue of the 
"middle ground" will die, and the goal 
of workable new legislation will be lost 
as the controversy becomes increasingly 
heated. 
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Although it is possible to formulate stronger moral principles than "animals should 
not be made to suffer unnecessarily," there are significant grounds for doubting these 
stronger principles. But the principle that underlies the dictum regarding unnecessary 
suffering is generally recognized as valid, since denial of it implies that we can do what-
ever we want with animals, a conclusion that is usually considered unacceptable. A 
determination of whether any particular instance of suffering is necessary or unneces-
sary must be based on an analysis of both the seriousness of the purpose of the act 
that involves pain in animals, and its relative avoidability, as well as more concrete 
concerns like costs and availability of resources for a given community. 
We can conclude, with reasonable certainty, that animals are suffering, by mak-
ing observations of changes in physiological and behavioral factors that are similar to 
the changes that tell us other humans are in pain. Further, the conclusion that any ani-
mal is suffering is sound, according to scientific methodology, because this hypothe-
sis is usually the best available explanation for the observed alterations in physiology 
or behavior. 
Zusammenfassung 
Dieser Artikel behandelt die verschiedenen Auslegungen des Prinzips, dass 
man Tiere nicht unnotig leiden lassen darf. Das Prinzip von "unnotigem Leiden" 
wird vornehmlich im Zusammenhang mit der landwirtschaftlichen Praxis behandelt, 
ist aber auch fUr viele andere Sachgebiete, die in diesem Artikel nicht zur Sprache 
kommen, von grosser Bedeutung. 
Tiere nicht unnotig leiden zu lassen ist ein weithin anerkanntes und gultiges 
Prinzip. Die Verleugnung dieses Grundsatzes brachte unannehmbare Folgen mit 
sich, so konnte z.B. jedermann mit Tieren machen was er will. Als allgemein aner-
kanntes Prinzip wurde es auch zur ethischen Grundlage fUr viele Gesetze, welche 
das Wohl der Tierwelt sicherstellen (Jackson, 1978; Leavitt, 1968). Ein weiter Person-
enkreis hat strengere ethische Prinzipien befurwortet, z.B. dass Tiere ein Recht auf 
Freiheit haben oder dass lnteressen der Tiere denen des Menschen nicht nachstehen 
und somit gleichermassen berucksichtigt werden mussen (Rachels, 1976; Singer, 
1975). Es gibt jedoch bedeutende Grunde, solche Stellungnahmen, die sich uber die 
in diesem Artikel besprochenen Prinzipien hinwegsetzen, anzugreifen. Da jedoch 
das Prinzip, so wie es hier vertreten wird, auf keinen ernsthaften Wiederstand stosst 
und die Verleugnung desselben weitherum zu Konflikten mit dem Gesetz fuhrt, 
Dr. Hurnik is Professor in the Department of Animal Science at the University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario. 
Dr. Lehman is Professor of Philosophy at University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario. 
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bekennen sich die Autoren zum Prinzip, dass man Tiere nicht unnotig leiden lassen 
darf. Kl.. d 
In der Meinung der Autoren muss dieses Bekenntnis auf weiterer arung ~r 
Behandlung selbst begrundet sein, denn die verschiedenen Auswirkungen/Folgen fur 
das Tier konnen allein aufgrund des Prinzips nicht festgelegt werd~n. Ob':ohl das 
Prinzip bereits als Crundlage fur viele Cesetze verwendet wurde, 1st v:en1~ ge:an 
d de Begriff des "unnotigen Leidens" klarzustellen. Erforderl1ch 1st eme wor en, n .d b d · 
klare Unterscheidung zwischen notwendigem und unnotigem Le1 en. _A er ~ 1s_t 
noch ein zweites Problem: diese Klarstellung kann nich jene Komplikat1o~en ell~l­
nieren die sich auch dann ergeben, wenn man unnotiges Leiden verme1den will. 
Denn :'unnotiges Leiden" kann nur mit grundlicher Kenntnis uber das Le1den ~er 
Tiere und wann Tiere leiden verhindert werden. In diesem Artikel werden be1de 
diese Probleme behandelt: 
1. Wie unterscheiden wir notiges und unnotiges Leiden? 
2. Wie wissen wir, wann ein Tier leidet? 
Moral Principles and Animals 
In this paper, we discuss the various 
ramifications of the principle that ani-
mals ought not to be made to suffer un-
necessarily. While we are primarily con-
cerned here with the implications of this 
principle for agricultural practices, what 
we have to say concerning "unnecessary 
suffering" has relevance to many other 
contexts that are not taken up in this 
paper. 
That animals should not be made to 
suffer unnecessarily is widely recogniz-
ed as a valid moral principle. That this 
principle is valid may be demonstrated 
by the fact that denial of it carries with it 
unacceptable implications: to wit, that a 
person can do whatever he or she pleases 
with animals. Because of the evident va-
lidity of this principle, it has been used 
as the ethical basis for many laws that 
are intended to protect the welfare of 
animals (Jackson, 1978; Leavitt, 1968). 
Some people have advocated stronger 
moral principles, for example, that ani-
mals have a right to liberty or that ani-
mals are entitled to equal consideration 
of interests (Rachels, 1976; Singer, 1975). 
But there are significant grounds for 
doubting these sorts of principles-
grounds that do not extend to the princi-
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pie under consideration in this paper. 
However, since the denial of the princi-
ple under consideration here is clearly 
invalid and since this principle is not 
open to serious objections, such as those 
that beset the stronger moral principles, 
we believe that this principle is true. 
While it is, we believe, reasonable 
to affirm the principle that we ought not 
to cause animals to suffer unnecessarily, 
such affirmation should be conditional 
upon further elaboration, since the vari-
ous implications of this principle for ac-
tual treatment of animals are not self-
evident. Although the principle has al-
ready been used as the basis for much 
legislation, little has been done to ex-
plicate the concept of "unnecessary suf-
fering." What is needed is some clarifi-
cation on the distinction between neces-
sary and unnecessary suffering. But there 
is also a second problem: clarification of 
this distinction will not eliminate all of 
the complications involved in the appli-
cation of the principle that we ought not 
to cause unnecessary suffering, because 
application of the principle requires a 
knowledge about when animals are suf-
fering. In this paper we shall discuss 
both of these problems briefly: 
1. How do we distinguish between 
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necessary and unnecessary suffering? 
2. How do we know when an animal 
is suffering? 
Necessary Versus Unnecessary 
Suffering 
What is unnecessary suffering? To 
answer this question, let us consider the 
possible connotations of the term "un-
necessary." An event might be said to be 
necessary if it is the result of causal fac-
tors over which people have no control. 
Thus, one possible definition of "unnec-
essary suffering" is: 
• Suffering is unnecessary if it is 
avoidable. Another connotation of the 
term "unnecessary" relates to purpose: 
an event is unnecessary if it is done 
purposefully. Thus, another p~ss'i'b_le 
definition of "unnecessary suffermg 1s: 
• Suffering is unnecessary if it is 
brought about purposefully. 
Is either of these two definitions of 
"unnecessary suffering" acceptable? The 
answer to this question is, we believe, 
negative. Neither of these definitions of 
"unnecessary suffering" is fully satisfac-
tory. When we say that we ought not to 
cause unnecessary suffering, we mean 
neither that we ought not to cause suf-
fering on purpose nor that we ought not 
to cause avoidable suffering. A great 
deal of suffering that is both avoidable 
and purposefully caused is suffering 
that is necessary suffering. A scientist 
doing research on the effectiveness of 
some treatment for a disease may pur-
posefully bring about avoidable suffer-
ing in some experimental animals, but 
such suffering is necessary suffering. We 
do not agree that the scientist ought not 
to cause such suffering, unless he can 
achieve the same research goals in some 
alternative manner, that is, in some man-
ner that causes less suffering or no suf-
fering at all. 
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A determination of whether suffer-
ing can be considered necessary or justi-
fied is clearly related to an examination 
of the purpose for which the suffering in 
question is caused. Suffering that is 
brought about merely to gratify the sa-
distic pleasures of some human being is 
unjustified. Suffering that is unlikely to 
add significantly to the well-being of the 
human community or to that of animals 
is, for the most part, unjustified. Further-
more, whether suffering is justified is 
clearly related to the avoidability of the 
suffering. In this respect, one of the def-
initions of unnecessary suffering that we 
rejected above is, in part, on the right 
track. We should not say that suffering 
was necessary suffering if the purpose 
for which the suffering was brought 
about was not sufficiently worthwhile, 
or even if the purpose for which the suf-
fering was brought about was sufficient-
ly worthwhile, if it could have been 
achieved without causing suffering to 
the same extent. Of course, questions 
can be raised concerning the formula-
tion of methods for the determination 
and measurement of the importance of 
human purposes. These questions raise 
deep issues in regard to theories of ~al­
ues- issues that cannot be pursued In a 
brief paper. It is our view that certain 
purposes, such as the provision of ad-
equate nourishing food and sa:e. and _ef-
fective medicines, are of suff1c1ent Im-
portance. Other purposes, such as those 
relating to personal appearance, are 
more dubious as to their importance, 
while still other purposes such as, for ex-
ample, the alleviation of a slight in-
convenience concerned with animal care, 
are of no importance. 
In the last paragraph we argued 
that the necessity of some suffering is 
relative to both the purpose and the 
avoidability of the suffering. It is also 
relative to human knowledge, at any 
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A determination of whether suffer-
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red from the points made in the last par-
agraph. Some suffering may be avoid-
able only if human beings know how to 
take steps to avoid it. Thus, advances in 
knowledge or technology may have im-
plications concerning what kinds and 
degrees of suffering are necessary. Even 
though suffering of farm animals from 
certain diseases was unavoidable in ear-
lier times, such suffering is, in many 
cases, avoidable today. Some people 
may try to justify the suffering of farm 
animals in modern times under certain 
conditions by asserting that such ani-
mals have always suffered under those 
conditions. But this proffered justifica-
tion is often unacceptable. 
Suffering and the Cost of 
Alleviating It 
It is, perhaps, less apparent that 
whether or not suffering is necessary, it 
is related to costs and available re-
sources. Nonetheless, this is in fact the 
case. Even in instances in which the 
knowledge required to alleviate animal 
suffering is available to a community, it 
may be too expensive for the people in 
that community to apply such knowl-
edge and thereby reduce animal suffer-
ing. In a poor society, where the people 
have barely enough resources to pro-
duce what is necessary for food, cloth-
ing, and shelter, any expense to reduce 
suffering of farm animals that is not ful-
ly compensated by increases in produc-
tivity of food would be too costly to 
bear. By contrast, for a community that 
produces surplus food relatively inex-
pensively, certain increases in cost pro-
duction can be accepted, even though 
such increases do not yield increased 
productivity, providing that such in-
creases really do reflect a reduction in 
suffering in animals. In modern in-
dustrialized societies, where the cost of 
food represents a relatively small frac-
tion of the income of the community, 
certain practices that cause animal suf-
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fering should not be accepted. Such 
practices include improper handling and 
care of animals, inadequate nutrition, 
reduction in space to unreasonably 
small amounts, and failure to allow for 
the expression of genetically condition-
ed behavioral propensities. 
We might summarize this part of 
our discussion in the following way: 
Suffering of animals is unnecessary 
suffering if it is not essential for pur-
poses of sufficient importance or if 
it could be avoided by adopting al-
ternative practices that would achieve 
the same important purposes, but 
would result in less suffering, pro-
viding that such alternative prac-
tices were not too expensive for the 
community in question to bear. 
Identifying Suffering in Animals 
Let us now turn to the other prob-
lem that arises if we try to apply the 
moral principle under consideration. If 
we are to avoid unnecessary suffering, 
we must know what conditions lead to 
animal suffering. How do we know when 
animals are suffering? Some people may 
maintain that we don't know that farm 
animals ever suffer. While this is an ex-
treme position to which few people ac-
tually subscribe, it may be instructive to 
consider what steps one might take in 
the attempt to persuade such a person 
that his position is mistaken. With this in 
mind, one might start by asking such a 
person whether he believes that human 
beings other than himself can suffer? If 
he answers this question in the negative, 
then we can dismiss his view as absurd. 
Possibly there is nothing that we can do 
to convince him that his view is mistak-
en, but there is I ittle danger that very 
many other people will ever agree with 
him. Let us assume, then, that we are 
conversing with a person who agrees 
that other human beings suffer, but 
doubts that animals suffer. We might 
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ask such a person to tell us how he 
knows that human beings suffer; that is, 
we might ask him to describe the evi-
dence available to him which supports 
his contention that human beings suffer. 
Since we are discussing the ways by 
which he comes to know that humans 
other than himself do sometimes suffer, 
he cannot say that he has this knowl-
edge because he himself can feel the ac-
tual pain of others. 
At this point there are several 
courses of argument that he might adopt, 
and a full discussion of this issue would 
require a lengthy treatise and is there-
fore inappropriate in this context. In our 
view, the consequence of such a discus-
sion would be that we know that human 
beings are sometimes in pain, because 
the hypothesis that they are in pain is 
the best explanation that we can offer 
for certain kinds of behavior that we ob-
serve. For example, in most cases, the 
best explanation that we have of limping 
behavior in a human being is that the 
person who is limping has a pain in his 
leg or foot. 
Furthermore, we can make the same 
types of observations on other animals 
in pain as we do in the case of other 
human beings. For example, if we see an 
animal standing on three legs, the best 
explanation we may have of this behav-
ior is that the animal is doing this to 
avoid the pain that it feels when it puts 
some weight on its fourth limb. Our 
theory that there is pain in the animal's 
limb rests essentially on the same type 
of evidence as our knowledge of the 
pain in another person's leg. According 
to circumstances and the type of animal 
in question, observations of such behav-
iors as rigid posture, limited use of a part 
of the body, changed level of alertness, 
alteration of such factors as respiratory 
rate, heart rate or body temperature, dis-
organized behavior, vocalization, in-
tense homotopic investigation, etc., are 
observable behaviors that are best ex-
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plained by the hypothesis that the ani-
mal in question is suffering from some 
unpleasant stimulus or painful state. 
We have argued above that we ar-
rive at a determination that animals are 
suffering pain because this hypothesis is 
essential for formulating the best avail-
able explanation for observable animal 
behavior. We have essentially the same 
type of evidence for the existence of 
other psychological states in animals. 
For example, observations of escape re-
actions are evidence of fear. Now, it is 
most important to note that our evi-
dence for such psychological states as 
fear, boredom, or pain is not fallacious 
anthropomorphic reasoning. The evi-
dence that we have that an animal is 
afraid or in pain does not consist of dub-
ious analogies to human behavior. For 
example, what grounds are available to 
support the contention that a sheep 
which sees or smells a wolf feels afraid? 
We do not say that we know that the 
sheep is afraid because when human be-
ings are in contact with wolves they feel 
afraid. Such reasoning would be fallaci-
ous and might lead to absurd conclu-
sions. Rather, the evidence that the 
sheep feels fear in the vicinity of the 
wolf includes observations of physiolog-
ical and behavioral factors, as well as 
the consideration that fear appears to 
make a significant contribution to the 
animal's chance of survival. While it 
might be suggested that we don't need 
the hypothesis that the animal feels fear 
in order to explain the animal's behavior 
in the presence of the wolf- that such 
an explanation can be given without ref-
erence to the animal's mental state, we 
believe that this suggestion is superfici-
al. To see that this is so, we ask the read-
er to try to describe and explain the 
sheep's behavior in a useful way without 
using terminology that carries some im-
plications concerning the sheep's men-
tal state. We believe that reference to 
the animal's fear is warranted because 
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mals have always suffered under those 
conditions. But this proffered justifica-
tion is often unacceptable. 
Suffering and the Cost of 
Alleviating It 
It is, perhaps, less apparent that 
whether or not suffering is necessary, it 
is related to costs and available re-
sources. Nonetheless, this is in fact the 
case. Even in instances in which the 
knowledge required to alleviate animal 
suffering is available to a community, it 
may be too expensive for the people in 
that community to apply such knowl-
edge and thereby reduce animal suffer-
ing. In a poor society, where the people 
have barely enough resources to pro-
duce what is necessary for food, cloth-
ing, and shelter, any expense to reduce 
suffering of farm animals that is not ful-
ly compensated by increases in produc-
tivity of food would be too costly to 
bear. By contrast, for a community that 
produces surplus food relatively inex-
pensively, certain increases in cost pro-
duction can be accepted, even though 
such increases do not yield increased 
productivity, providing that such in-
creases really do reflect a reduction in 
suffering in animals. In modern in-
dustrialized societies, where the cost of 
food represents a relatively small frac-
tion of the income of the community, 
certain practices that cause animal suf-
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fering should not be accepted. Such 
practices include improper handling and 
care of animals, inadequate nutrition, 
reduction in space to unreasonably 
small amounts, and failure to allow for 
the expression of genetically condition-
ed behavioral propensities. 
We might summarize this part of 
our discussion in the following way: 
Suffering of animals is unnecessary 
suffering if it is not essential for pur-
poses of sufficient importance or if 
it could be avoided by adopting al-
ternative practices that would achieve 
the same important purposes, but 
would result in less suffering, pro-
viding that such alternative prac-
tices were not too expensive for the 
community in question to bear. 
Identifying Suffering in Animals 
Let us now turn to the other prob-
lem that arises if we try to apply the 
moral principle under consideration. If 
we are to avoid unnecessary suffering, 
we must know what conditions lead to 
animal suffering. How do we know when 
animals are suffering? Some people may 
maintain that we don't know that farm 
animals ever suffer. While this is an ex-
treme position to which few people ac-
tually subscribe, it may be instructive to 
consider what steps one might take in 
the attempt to persuade such a person 
that his position is mistaken. With this in 
mind, one might start by asking such a 
person whether he believes that human 
beings other than himself can suffer? If 
he answers this question in the negative, 
then we can dismiss his view as absurd. 
Possibly there is nothing that we can do 
to convince him that his view is mistak-
en, but there is I ittle danger that very 
many other people will ever agree with 
him. Let us assume, then, that we are 
conversing with a person who agrees 
that other human beings suffer, but 
doubts that animals suffer. We might 
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ask such a person to tell us how he 
knows that human beings suffer; that is, 
we might ask him to describe the evi-
dence available to him which supports 
his contention that human beings suffer. 
Since we are discussing the ways by 
which he comes to know that humans 
other than himself do sometimes suffer, 
he cannot say that he has this knowl-
edge because he himself can feel the ac-
tual pain of others. 
At this point there are several 
courses of argument that he might adopt, 
and a full discussion of this issue would 
require a lengthy treatise and is there-
fore inappropriate in this context. In our 
view, the consequence of such a discus-
sion would be that we know that human 
beings are sometimes in pain, because 
the hypothesis that they are in pain is 
the best explanation that we can offer 
for certain kinds of behavior that we ob-
serve. For example, in most cases, the 
best explanation that we have of limping 
behavior in a human being is that the 
person who is limping has a pain in his 
leg or foot. 
Furthermore, we can make the same 
types of observations on other animals 
in pain as we do in the case of other 
human beings. For example, if we see an 
animal standing on three legs, the best 
explanation we may have of this behav-
ior is that the animal is doing this to 
avoid the pain that it feels when it puts 
some weight on its fourth limb. Our 
theory that there is pain in the animal's 
limb rests essentially on the same type 
of evidence as our knowledge of the 
pain in another person's leg. According 
to circumstances and the type of animal 
in question, observations of such behav-
iors as rigid posture, limited use of a part 
of the body, changed level of alertness, 
alteration of such factors as respiratory 
rate, heart rate or body temperature, dis-
organized behavior, vocalization, in-
tense homotopic investigation, etc., are 
observable behaviors that are best ex-
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plained by the hypothesis that the ani-
mal in question is suffering from some 
unpleasant stimulus or painful state. 
We have argued above that we ar-
rive at a determination that animals are 
suffering pain because this hypothesis is 
essential for formulating the best avail-
able explanation for observable animal 
behavior. We have essentially the same 
type of evidence for the existence of 
other psychological states in animals. 
For example, observations of escape re-
actions are evidence of fear. Now, it is 
most important to note that our evi-
dence for such psychological states as 
fear, boredom, or pain is not fallacious 
anthropomorphic reasoning. The evi-
dence that we have that an animal is 
afraid or in pain does not consist of dub-
ious analogies to human behavior. For 
example, what grounds are available to 
support the contention that a sheep 
which sees or smells a wolf feels afraid? 
We do not say that we know that the 
sheep is afraid because when human be-
ings are in contact with wolves they feel 
afraid. Such reasoning would be fallaci-
ous and might lead to absurd conclu-
sions. Rather, the evidence that the 
sheep feels fear in the vicinity of the 
wolf includes observations of physiolog-
ical and behavioral factors, as well as 
the consideration that fear appears to 
make a significant contribution to the 
animal's chance of survival. While it 
might be suggested that we don't need 
the hypothesis that the animal feels fear 
in order to explain the animal's behavior 
in the presence of the wolf- that such 
an explanation can be given without ref-
erence to the animal's mental state, we 
believe that this suggestion is superfici-
al. To see that this is so, we ask the read-
er to try to describe and explain the 
sheep's behavior in a useful way without 
using terminology that carries some im-
plications concerning the sheep's men-
tal state. We believe that reference to 
the animal's fear is warranted because 
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the best available descriptions and ex-
planations of the sheep's observable be-
havior make reference to its fear. Rea-
soning in this way is in accord with 
sound canons of scientific method; it is 
not anthropomorphic. 
We have argued that we have me-
thodologically sound scientific evidence 
for the existence of mental states in ani-
mals. This point may be illustrated fur-
ther with another example. Let us ask, 
What grounds support the contention 
that a pregnant sow that is denied the 
opportunity to make some sort of nest 
with straw or some other material suf-
fers to some degree from the frustration 
of what is, for pigs, a natural instinct. 
Again, no support for this contention is 
derived from alleged similarities with 
human behavior. Rather, we observe the 
sow's behavior. Such observation will 
support the above contention: Many sows 
that are close to parturition and lack 
nest-building material will investigate 
the floor and engage in what may be de-
scribed as "vacuum" nest building with 
their heads, that is to say, they engage in 
a sort of pantomime of nest building. 
Some pigs in that condition also show in-
creased stereotypy and bar-biting. Such 
behavior may be a consequence of labor 
pain, but may also be indicative of a 
state of frustration associated with the 
absence of nesting material. 
Someone may criticize the remarks 
that we have made here by claiming that 
the evidence that we have concerning the 
suffering of the sow, etc., does not con-
stitute proof that the animals in question 
are suffering. This objection reflects a 
type of skepticism that is legitimate in 
many cases. We must be ready to admit, 
with respect to many claims such as 
those illustrated above, that we may be 
mistaken; to be rigidly dogmatic about 
our contention would be unscientific. 
But, to deny or doubt conclusions that 
are supported by good scientific reason-
ing is also faulty scientific methodology. 
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We have good scientific evidence that 
injured or diseased animals suffer pain 
and, similarly, we have, in some cases, 
good scientific evidence that animals 
suffer fear or boredom. Such evidence 
may not amount to absolute certainty, 
but that sort of certainty is rarely, if 
ever, attained in scientific studies. 
The Issue of Intensive Agriculture 
Prior to concluding this paper, we 
wish to raise two further points. First, it 
is fashionable these days to direct criti-
cism toward intensive methods of ani-
mal agriculture. But the type of question 
we have been considering, namely, wheth-
er some agricultural practices cause un-
necessary suffering, is of much broader 
relevance, because criticisms based on 
the principle of avoiding such suffering 
are also applicable to non-intensive 
methods of animal agriculture. For ex-
ample, one might consider chickens raised 
in "free-range" conditions. In such con-
ditions, the birds might regularly suffer 
from harsh weather, predators, high inci-
dence of parasites, infections transfer-
red from wild animals, etc. Also, in free-
range conditions, disease prevention and 
precise medication are difficult to at-
tain. Given our capability to reduce or 
eliminate such forms of suffering, we 
may well ask whether animals raised in 
free-range conditions are suffering un-
necessarily. It is not at all clear that the 
extent or intensity of suffering of birds 
raised on a "free range" is less than any 
discomfort that the birds suffer when 
raised in cages. 
Second, in raising the issue of wheth-
er some agricultural practices cause un-
necessary suffering, we are not impugn-
ing the motives of the producer who has 
employed such practices- he or she is 
not deliberately cruel. In saying that a 
particular practice causes unnecessary 
suffering, we are not saying that the 
practice was introduced merely to cause 
suffering and we are not saying that the 
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producer is an insensitive person. Some 
animal welfarists have made such criti-
cisms, but we do not believe such char-
acter assassination of those engaged in 
animal agriculture is justified. However, 
agriculturists are incorrect if they be-
lieve that there can be no legitimate crit-
icisms of agricultural practices from a 
moral point of view, or that the critics of 
agricultural practices are doing nothing 
more than making unfounded vicious at-
tacks against the character of those who 
are engaged in production of food. 
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producer is an insensitive person. Some 
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cisms, but we do not believe such char-
acter assassination of those engaged in 
animal agriculture is justified. However, 
agriculturists are incorrect if they be-
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icisms of agricultural practices from a 
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